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Paradoxical Autonomy in Japan’s  
Platform Economy
SAORI SHIBATA
Crowdsourcing firms, their client firms and the government in Japan have advocated that crowd work 
provides opportunities for workers to enjoy autonomous working practices, enabling subpopulations 
such as women and the elderly who would otherwise be excluded from the labour market to find 
employment. This is far from the case. Instead, crowdsourcing is perhaps better considered a means, 
enabled by technological advances, by which to flexibilise the labour market. We have been witnessing 
a shift in the forms of domination and control imposed on labour from a direct, physical and onsite 
type of control to an indirect mechanism of domination that has rendered workers less visible while 
suppressing wages. This further implies that the paradoxical autonomy of crowd work is embedded in 
contemporary antagonism in Japanese employment relations.
Keywords: Platform, digital work, crowd work, Japan
Introduction
The digiTal economy continues to play a widely acknowledged role in transforming 
employment relations. This includes the emergence of work based on information 
and communications technology (ICT) using online network platforms. Such an 
employment scheme, known as crowd work or platform work, utilises labour 
by connecting employers to workers with access to online platforms where they 
can carry out tasks as independent contractors. Commentary on this new form of 
employment directs most attention to the opportunities it creates for workers, which 
is especially evident in Japan, where female and elderly workers seek flexible work 
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arrangements. This discourse focuses on how crowd work increases autonomy for 
workers by enabling them to choose where and when to work.
As this article shows, however, rather than generating opportunities, crowd 
work in Japan has instead contributed to creating a new group of vulnerable and 
impoverished non-regular workers within the Japanese labour market. Crowd 
workers find themselves having to work more cheaply, flexibly and efficiently than 
other non-regular workers to win contracts by marketing themselves as ultra-able 
workers. This is a new and indirect form of domination and control exercised by 
employers that has largely been masked through repeated references to workers’ 
autonomy. We have therefore been witnessing a shift in the forms of domination 
and control imposed on labour from a direct, physical and onsite type of control 
to an indirect mechanism of domination that has rendered workers less visible 
while suppressing wages. Although these trends have not gone unnoticed, this 
article explores the concrete development of crowd work in the Japanese case. 
The article examines the implications of the development of crowd work for the 
flexibilisation of the Japanese labour market, shedding light on the way in which 
Japan’s economy continues to liberalise.
The article first introduces the concept of crowd work and contextualises changes 
in employment relations in Japan, in which crowd work emerged. It then introduces 
an analytical framework characterised by the paradoxical nature of the autonomy 
that crowd work ostensibly grants to some labourers. This sets the stage for examin-
ing the transformation of Japanese employment relations and the way that crowd 
work has emerged as part of a more general trend towards the flexibilisation of 
employment relations in Japan.
Crowd Work
ICT-based work is not a new phenomenon. It has, however, increasingly come to 
be organised through online platforms, especially for crowd-working arrangements 
(Valenduc & Vendramin, 2016). Parker, van Alystyne, and Coudary (2016) define 
a platform as a business which creates interactions between producers and con-
sumers, providing an open participative infrastructure that facilitates the exchange 
of goods and services. The crowd work examined here focuses on online-based 
‘click workers’, excluding platform work which provides physical services, such as 
Uber and Task Rabbit, as these physical platform services are yet to be developed 
in the Japanese market. Crowd work enables large numbers of workers to engage 
in paid but fragmented jobs through online platforms. While some emphasise the 
potential of crowd work to create job opportunities and an autonomous working 
style, others highlight the precarity, instability, low wages and long working hours 
associated with crowd work.
Crowd working, a form of crowdsourcing, has evolved as firms outsource tasks 
to workers who are connected online (Howe, 2006), and advocates of crowd work 
claim that it is able to resolve geographical challenges and other problems that lead 
to shortages of experts (Kittur et al., 2013). Crowd workers can, of course, experi-
ence considerable autonomy (Valenduc & Vendramin, 2016) when choosing work. 
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On the surface, crowdsourcing creates the appearance of increasing  autonomy and 
choices for a broad range of workers, thereby creating opportunities for employers 
to tap into a global pool of talent.
The Development of Domination and Control in Japanese Employment Relations
To understand the emergence of crowd work in the context of Japan’s labour market, 
we need first to contextualise some of the wider changes in its long-term employ-
ment system. In so doing, we can explore the origins of crowd working and trace 
its development over the past 10 years.
Some scholars have praised the Japanese style of management, rooted in its 
unique culture, which ‘attache[s] an especially strong value to hierarchy, to group 
and organisational solidarity, and to a consensus’ (Hazama, 1997; Morikawa, 1973; 
Tsuda, 1987, cited in Mour & Kawanishi, 2005). These scholars view Japanese-style 
management as a superior organisational form, a humanistic approach to human 
resource management (Kenny & Florida, 1988; Tomaney, 1994). These studies 
emphasise what they regard as a superior form of management which provides 
discretion to and empowers workers, implying the importance of worker autonomy 
to effective management.
In contrast, more critical observers have tended to focus on the intensity of 
Japan’s production system, including the efficiency of its plants and the strenuous 
physical and mental efforts of workers (Ōhki, 1998). This, in turn, is associated 
with a particular style of labour management, marked by competition in the context 
of systematic inspection and evaluation of performance. This labour management 
scheme rewards effort with preferential treatment in terms of training, education and 
intra-company human relations. As such, firms suppress ‘workers’’ dissatisfaction 
and opposition by institutionalising corporate–labour management methods for 
individuals and groups of workers (Ōhki, 1998, pp. 226–228). In addition, workers 
must continuously demonstrate their usefulness to a firm through diligence, loyalty 
and flexibility (Dohse, Jugens, & Malsch, 1985). From the perspective of these 
scholars, Japanese labour relations in the 1980s and 1990s were not necessarily 
free of control, as hard work was imposed by the onsite monitoring and evaluation 
of workers. This study agrees with this view, that employment relations under the 
Japanese management style prior to the 2000s were characterised by workplace 
control.
Studies in the 1990s and 2000s began focusing on the transformation of 
employment relations in Japan in the post-bubble economy. We have witnessed 
an increasing number of non-regular workers (not including crowd workers) who 
have been facing employment insecurity and lower wages from the 1990s, includ-
ing part-time, temporary, and short-term contract workers, whose employment 
status is inherently unstable and precarious. One concerning trend regarding the 
non-regular workforce is the increasing number of dispatch workers (temp agency 
workers) (Shibata, 2016; Suzuki, 2018). Some temp workers are zero-hour contract 
workers who are hired through temp agencies but paid only when they are sent out 
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to companies and therefore face a significant level of insecurity in terms of wages 
and work availability. The emergence of other non-regular workers from the 1980s 
seems to have reflected a new form of workplace control achieved by flexibilising 
and precaritising workers.
The aforementioned increase in the use of flexible workers and the large-scale 
dismissals of those workers following the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 drew 
social criticism from labour and the larger public. This direct form of exploitation 
and control—dismissals of non-regular workers—triggered debates over employ-
ment security (Shibata, 2016). This led in part to a change in employment regula-
tions, generating a certain degree of protection for non-regular workers. In the 
meantime, the Japanese labour market has been facing acute labour shortages from 
the 2010s. This has forced the government and employers to be more conscious of 
the way they use non-regular workers as well as acknowledge the need to sustain 
flexible employment relations.
Under these circumstances, crowd work has proved useful for employers and the 
government insofar as it constitutes a new form of work in which a broader range 
of people can participate in contracted work whenever and wherever they want. 
While keeping employment relations flexible, the government can avoid criticism 
directed at the precaritisation of non-regular workers by locating crowd work as 
autonomous labour and differentiating crowd workers from other non-regular 
workers. At the same time, the business community benefits by utilising cheap 
crowd-worker labour under contracts that absolve them of legal responsibility for 
providing social benefits to those workers. The emergence of crowd work in Japan 
has represented a new addition to the shift towards the general flexibilisation/
casualisation of employment relations.
Japan has witnessed a shift from direct control of workers characterised by 
intensified production systems and heightened competition to a form of control 
enabled by providing precarious employment at lower wages under employ-
ment insecurity and creating replaceable workers such as zero-hour contrac-
tors. Reflecting criticism of precarious employment conditions experienced by 
non-regular workers and labour shortage, labour market policies have changed 
slightly such that the government, at the surface level, provides a certain degree 
of protection and employment security to maintain the workforce and deflect 
criticism. It is in this context that we should understand the emergence of crowd 
workers, a new form of digital labourers who have been positioned in public 
discourse as autonomous workers.
Paradoxical Autonomy and Control
Scholarly interest in the influence of technological development, including factory 
automation and new production efficiency management, on worker autonomy 
emerged between the 1970s and the 1980s during the era of Taylorism. In the 
early 2000s, the emergence of mobile phones and mobile email devices added a 
Science, Technology & Society 24:2 (2019): 271–287
Paradoxical auTonomy in JaPan’s PlaTform economy   275
new theme to discussions of worker autonomy (Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 
2013). Some researchers have examined the negative consequences of techno- 
logy on autonomy, in particular the possibility that it not only enhanced worker 
performance and motivation but also increased control of the workforce through 
automation (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979, cited in Mazmanian et al., 2013).
Control cannot be separated conceptually from autonomy, which has been 
studied by many scholars. For instance, in labour process theory, scholars have 
problematised control and examined how managers reduce the gap between work-
ers’ capabilities and what they actually do, and how managers exercise control 
over labour processes (Sewell, 2005). Taylor (1912) was sceptical of workers’ 
ability to use know-how for the benefit of an organisation; he therefore emphasised 
the importance of rigorously controlling the workplace (cited in Swell, 2005). In 
contrast, others focus on controlling knowledge and the indeterminacy of knowl-
edge. For instance, the post-Fordist literature has found that the form of control that 
characterises physical industrial work can be replaced by rewarding employ-
ment when workers ‘direct their discretionary efforts’ (Kenny & Florida, 1996; 
Piore & Sabel, 1984, cited in Sewell, 2005, p. 699) towards employers’ and/
or organisations’ ends. In other words, in the contemporary workplace, worker 
autonomy is created by controlling consciousness and knowledge rather than by 
onsite physical control.
The onsite type of control over the body was, therefore, gradually replaced 
by control of knowledge and the managerial rhetoric of empowerment (Swell, 
2005). Bauman (2002, cited in Swell, 2005) argues that although new knowledge 
workers can sell their knowledge to the highest bidder, they also find themselves 
involved in working practices that restrict their freedom or autonomy, as one form 
of exploitative employment relations replaces another. The present study adopts 
this understanding of workplace control and autonomy, accepting that employment 
relations have transformed from direct control over bodies to indirect control over 
consciousness and knowledge, continuing the use of labour practices that limit or 
exploit worker autonomy.
Studies in the area of business and management also explore ongoing contra-
dictions between autonomy and control in the workplace. For instance, Houlihan 
(2002) points out that organisations seek to implement palliative policies which 
can distract workers from routinised and intensive work practices by encouraging 
positive thinking, ‘matching employee lifestyles’ and reducing boredom, while 
demanding strong commitment or dedication (p. 81). These palliative strategies 
indicate the paradoxical nature of the superficial autonomy and freedom granted 
to workers.
Fleming and Sturdy (2011) similarly claim that the development of a particular 
discourse that promotes free, authentic and diverse work practices distracts workers’ 
attention from what in reality provides only limited discretion by highlighting the 
case of call-centre workers. They reveal the new management technique of empha-
sising freedom, the self and emancipation in the workplace to motivate workers 
and make them feel happy and free, albeit ‘in an inherently alienating environment’ 
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(p. 195). Autonomy is, therefore, paradoxical in the sense that workers might be 
persuaded to believe that they enjoy an autonomous work style, while often feeling 
controlled or trapped. Some workers, in particular knowledge professionals, tend to 
self-impose such restrictions and limit their own freedom, yet they accept the idea 
that new technologies enhance flexibility and generate new career or work oppor-
tunities (Mazmanian et al., 2013). The discourse surrounding crowd work in Japan 
resonates with this line of argument, in which the government and crowdsourcing 
companies emphasise the benefits of working autonomously and freely, while in 
fact workers are distracted by this palliative strategy, channelled into experiencing 
a paradoxical form of autonomy that is felt as freedom but leads to (sometimes 
unacknowledged) limitations.
Recent studies of technologies in the workplace also, directly or indirectly, raise 
the issue of control and autonomy. For instance, Moore demonstrates how new 
measurement technologies impact employment relations and workers’ autonomy 
by monitoring workers’ health and performance and judging their work capacity 
and performance (Moore, 2018). Lupton (2016) also shifts our attention to the 
construction of the ‘quantified self’ and how autonomy has been undermined by new 
measurement devices. She argues that technologies influence people’s behaviours, 
social relationships, employment and life opportunities. Beer’s (2016) study of 
metric power also touches on automation by demonstrating how extensive meas-
urement regimes have begun affecting life as well as work, sleep and emotions. 
He argues that metric power has the capacity to determine possibilities; in other 
words, measurement technologies can limit potential.
Many studies exploring the relationship between technologies and forms of work 
examine the impact of new technology on autonomy and argue that there are con-
tradictions surrounding such technologies, especially regarding the balance between 
worker autonomy or mechanisms of control in the workplace. As Mazmanian et 
al. (2013) suggest, many studies investigating technologies and autonomy find 
increasing tension between autonomy and control. These studies insightfully go 
beyond technological determinism by highlighting the limitations of technology as 
a means of enhancing worker autonomy and its function as a new means of control 
enabled by digital devices and quantification. This is an important point to keep in 
our mind when we discuss employment relations involving digital workers such 
as crowd workers and online-based client employers in the digital age.
This study integrates these critical views of technology and the paradoxical 
autonomy that digital work creates. The study seeks to conceptualise how autonomy 
and control in the online-based workplace have been enhanced. This conceptualisa-
tion enables us to understand how digital labour (crowd workers) find themselves 
paradoxically autonomous and controlled at the same time. This study also seeks 
to demonstrate how crowd work has been characterised by this tension between 
autonomy and control by examining a concrete case of crowd work in Japan. In the 
next section, we examine the process through which the Japanese labour market 
adapted itself to the crowdsourcing industry.
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Crowd Work in Japan
Crowd work in Japan has grown significantly over the last 10 years. The number 
of crowd workers in Japan has reached five million, comprising 5 per cent of 
the population (Ninhon Keizai Shinbun, 2018). Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIC) estimates that roughly 1.5 million people work as crowd 
workers (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications [MIC], 2018). This is 
roughly 8 per cent of the 20 million non-regular Japanese workers (Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare [MHLW], 2017). As platform-based jobs increase, a 
growing number of individual workers will not join firms as long-term or permanent 
employees, instead, using their free time to work and applying their skills on an 
‘on-demand’ basis (MIC, 2016). The MIC reports that crowd work in particular 
has become a safety net for female and elderly workers (2016). For its part in the 
debate outlined above, the Japanese government tends to portray crowd work as a 
means of creating opportunities for Japanese workers.
This section illustrates the types of jobs and forms of employment relations 
crowdsourcing has provided by examining several crowdsourcing firms in Japan.
Types of Crowd Work in Japan
Many crowdsourcing businesses follow roughly one of three models of employment: 
project-based, competition-based and task-based models of employment (Small 
and Medium Enterprise Agency, 2014). The project-based model often requires 
expertise and higher skill levels, such as those needed for systems engineering and 
website design. Crowd workers apply for advertised projects with their work plans, 
costs, the projected time need to complete the work and other relevant information 
to appeal to their potential clients (employers) (Lancers, 2017). Employers can 
choose the best crowd workers from among the many applications they receive. 
Project-based jobs typically occupy on average between a few days and a few 
months, and payments under this model vary between a few thousand and a few 
million yen, paid on completion of a project (CrowdWorks, 2017; MIC, 2014).
The competition-based model is similar to the project-based model, although 
in this case the duration of work is typically much shorter, varying between a few 
minutes and a few hours, and also suffers problems associated with late payments 
(and sometimes non- or underpayments) (MIC, 2014; Rengo, 2016). For instance, 
in some cases, crowd workers apply for projects after planning how they would 
carry out the required tasks and sharing their ideas and estimates with clients who 
advertised those jobs without ever hearing back from the would-be clients. In such 
cases, the workers worry that the clients to whom they applied for work might have 
used their ideas without paying for them. This is, therefore, an obvious risk faced 
by crowd workers, who can be paid only after completing their assigned jobs. 
As Huws (2014) points out, digital workers are alienated from their own labour 
because they are employed to do such fragmented tasks that they often do not know 
to which final products/commodities their work has contributed.
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The task-based model of crowd work tends to include smaller, often lower-
skilled, jobs or tasks, including administrative tasks, designing simple websites, 
writing short advertising articles, inputting data and clicking website links (Lancers, 
2017). The fragmented way in which these tasks are distributed, and the scale of the 
competition for jobs, are such that they have been noted for creating a ‘race to the 
bottom’ as crowd workers seek to reduce their cost estimates to competitive levels 
(Uluru, 2015). Thus, remuneration for task-based jobs in Japan ranges between 
USD 0.04 and 2.3 (USD) per task. In addition, 22 per cent of crowd workers who 
engage in task-based work have experienced delays in payment, with roughly 
15 per cent of these experiencing no payment or underpayment (Rengo, 2016). 
This problem is exacerbated by the lack of regulatory control of platform work 
under the minimum wage system.
Satisfied Employers
From an employer’s perspective, crowdsourcing creates opportunities to reduce 
costs and avoid burdensome responsibilities. The government seeks to highlight 
the putative freedom and autonomy of crowd work by publicising survey results. 
In a survey conducted by the MIC, more than half of the employers who responded 
(55.7 per cent) claimed that crowd service improved productivity and efficiency. 
48.9 per cent reported that it reduced commuting time (MIC, 2015). In addition, 
64.9 per cent of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) responded that 
crowdsourcing is useful for its ‘just-in-time’ employment scheme, and 57.3 per 
cent viewed crowdsourcing as filling a gap in the workforce (Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency, 2014). This clearly evinces the government’s effort to creating 
a positive image of crowdsourcing for employers and highlights the high degree 
of flexibility crowdsourcing can create.
Work-life Balance
In addition to praising crowd work for enhancing efficiency, many employers (30 
per cent) also welcomed crowd working on the grounds that it improves work-life 
balance for their employees. Another 38.7 per cent of employers who reported that 
they were considering incorporating crowd work into their business models reported 
perceiving it as a potential benefit for employees (MIC, 2015).
These survey findings should be viewed in the context of Japan’s labour market, 
which is widely thought to suffer from problems caused by long working hours, as 
evidenced by elevated rates of premature death and suicide. As such, a kind of moral 
panic has emerged across much of Japan, generating pressure on Japanese firms to 
address the poor work-life balance afflicting Japanese workers. The introduction 
of crowd working, therefore, represents a somewhat superficial means by which 
to appear to be tackling the problem of excessive work hours in a way that costs 
employers little or nothing (and indeed yields a number of benefits). By highlight-
ing the results of its own survey, the government seeks to create the impression 
that crowd work improves work-life balance and thereby benefits both employers 
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and employees as it emphasises the fictitious freedom it purportedly offers 
employees.
Cost Reduction
The pursuit of reduced staffing costs reflects one of the most important motives 
driving the increase in crowdsourcing among hiring firms. The aforementioned 
survey finds that 36.3 per cent of potential employers view reduced costs as a reason 
to engage in crowdsourcing (MIC, 2015). Crowdsourcing firms clearly highlight 
their ability to reduce staffing costs for client firms as well as costs associated 
with providing office space, equipment and worker benefits and insurance (MIC, 
2016). This feature has attracted both private firms and public sector authorities, 
including government ministries and local government administrations, to consider 
crowdsourcing to access labour. The government demonstrates the cost efficiency 
of crowdsourcing and just-in-time availability of crowd workers by using the 
services for itself.
Employment Opportunities
Crowd work, therefore, provides employment opportunities for workers who tend 
to be less privileged than regular male workers in the traditional labour market. 
More female workers (about 40 per cent), and people in their 50s (45 per cent) and 
60s (40 per cent), than males (33 per cent) use crowd work as their primary jobs 
(Rengo, 2016). Although many crowd workers are dissatisfied with their income, 
crowd work is gaining increasing popularity. Indeed, a survey conducted by the MIC 
(2016) reveals that over 42 per cent of respondents would like to choose when to 
work and 36 per cent would like to choose where to work. Elderly workers over 50 
years of age choose crowd work for self-improvement or extra disposable income 
(CrowdWorks, 2016). Female workers, in particular, have tended to engage in 
unpaid household work, and it is therefore unsurprising that 17 per cent of female 
crowd workers cite the ability to take care of housework and family affairs as a 
reason for engaging in crowd work (Rengo, 2016).
These survey results indicate that employers are satisfied with this new form 
of labour as many have embraced the use of flexible contracted digital workers. 
The crowd workers themselves are satisfied with their work but only to a certain 
degree. This is partly because the government has succeeded in advocating for the 
benefits of crowd work by pointing out the high level of satisfaction indicated by 
its surveys and the opportunities that crowd work creates. This study seeks to go 
beyond such technological determinism, in which ‘technology is conceived as an 
actor that results in certain phenomena with societal characteristics’ (Fuchs, 2014, 
p. 328), and on the basis of which the government and employers tend to highlight 
only the benefits and advantages of digital work. The present study takes the position 
that evaluating the nature of crowd work is not, however, entirely straightforward, 
concurring that crowd work has ‘no inbuilt effects or determinations’ but is rather 
‘embedded in antagonism’ (Fuchs, 2014, p. 328) that marks labour relations in 
Japan. The next section examines how employees view crowd work and how the 
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crowdsourcing sector has influenced employment relations in Japan, which itself 
has been witnessing many transformations and an increase in precarious work 
since the 1990s.
Paradoxical Autonomy of Crowd Work
By examining crowd workers’ experiences more closely, it is argued in this sec-
tion that crowd work has increased worker vulnerability. The paper also argues 
that crowd work has been embraced as a means of enhancing the flexibilisation of 
labour by the government and employers in such a way that employers can avoid 
being held responsible for flexibilisation by employing crowd workers because 
the arrangement grants workers greater autonomy. It further examines the way in 
which crowdsourcing businesses in Japan operate, with a particular focus on the 
associated risks and concerns. It draws on survey results issued by the government 
(the MIC), Rengo (the Japan Trade Union Confederation), crowdsourcing firms 
and a citizens’ group. It also analyses online review sites where crowd workers 
evaluate crowdsourcing firms and their work experiences, government reports, 
research institutes and online information published by crowdsourcing companies.
Low Pay for Task-based Crowd Jobs
Perhaps the greatest cost to workers involved with crowd work is that of low pay for 
low-skilled participants. There are no data available indicating the average wages of 
crowd workers. Income from crowd work varies, depending largely on whether it is 
a worker’s main job. In cases where it is the main job, monthly income is typically 
around USD 664 (73,268 yen), whereas it is roughly USD 274 (30,249 yen) for those 
working as crowd workers alongside other work. While CrowdWorks advertises 
that common crowd jobs such as data inputting provide USD 9.2 (1,000 yen) per 
hour, many tasks advertised offer extremely low remuneration. Remuneration for 
the task-based crowd job of a 5-minute interpretation or translation is merely USD 
1.4 (150 yen) and sometimes lower (Lancers, 2017).
A divergence in pay rates between skilled and unskilled crowd workers seems 
to affect the level of workers’ satisfaction with pay. For instance, 66.3 per cent of 
low-skilled crowd workers who carry out simple tasks such as inputting data and 
minor account adjusting are dissatisfied with their pay, whereas only 33 per cent 
of those workers are satisfied (Rengo, 2016). The level of satisfaction with pay, 
therefore, tends to vary according to the type of work involved, with the level of 
satisfaction rising for those doing computer systems development and programming, 
whereas it is much lower for those conducting task-based crowd jobs (Rengo, 2016).
Crowd workers who have registered with Lancers mention, ‘Lancers may be the 
place for people with certain skills, they may be able to earn enough. Unless you 
have some skills, there are hardly any tasks that you can do and it is extremely dif-
ficult to earn sufficient side income’ (Zaitaku Worker, 2018a, author’s translation).
These considerations strongly suggest that crowd workers who conduct simple 
tasks, representing a plurality of crowd workers (roughly 40 per cent), are paid 
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poorly for their ‘autonomous’ work. Although they provide just-in-time work, they 
receive low remuneration and report a correspondingly low level of satisfaction. 
The level of satisfaction rises for crowd workers who utilise such work as a sup-
plementary job. Moreover, low pay is accepted as adequate by many female and 
elderly workers who find few work opportunities in the general labour market. 
Female workers with family responsibilities to meet might believe that it is better 
to have some income than nothing. This makes crowd working relatively attractive 
and gives them a sense of freedom even though, as we will see, it might be better 
considered a fictitious form of freedom. This highlights the contradictions involved 
in an idealised conception of crowd work. The era of technological hegemony 
creates fragmented work tasks, for which the majority of crowd workers are paid 
subminimum wages. Despite this, importantly, technological hegemony has gener-
ated some sense of satisfaction among crowd workers.
Uncertain Pay for All Crowd Workers
Almost all crowd workers worry about uncertainty over being paid. Crowdsourcing 
firms generally charge client firms a fee for requested tasks/projects that is retained 
while the work is carried and released to the worker only after a task/project is 
complete. While a client firm that cancels a contract incurs a penalty, it nevertheless 
retains a significant amount of this penalty, ensuring that workers lose when work 
is cancelled. Indeed, this is one of the main ways in which crowd workers suffer 
non-payment or underpayment.
All crowd workers are paid at the point of completion of tasks. This method 
of payment also implies that some crowd workers are required to go without pay 
for relatively long periods of time. This problem is compounded, moreover, by 
the fact that nearly 50 per cent of project-based crowd workers including systems 
engineers and developers experience late payments for work completed (Rengo, 
2016). As such, many crowd workers experience anxiety that is associated with 
both the need to be highly competitive to win bids and the uncertainty regarding 
payments for work completed.
Crowd workers generally receive much lower levels of pay than most other 
workers, including other non-regular workers (cited in Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry [METI], 2016). Payment for many tasks is, therefore, significantly 
below minimum wage, which is not enforced for crowd workers. In addition, crowd 
workers receive no welfare benefits. This means lower pay for crowd workers 
than for other non-regular workers because employers can avoid providing crowd 
workers with legal welfare benefits that they provide to other non-regular workers. 
This suggests that not only low-skilled crowd workers but also high-skilled crowd 
workers can struggle with payment issues and low remuneration.
Monitoring and Control
Many crowdsourcing companies assign evaluation scores to crowd workers, 
enabling client employers to differentiate workers on the basis of these scores 
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(MIC, 2014). In the case of Lancers, this includes a certification system that rewards 
crowd workers who receive higher scores and monthly rankings of the workers 
(Lancers, 2017). In the case of CrowdWorks, workers’ portfolio pages include 
similarly skilled crowd workers, enabling employers to surf through workers’ 
pages to compare those with similar skill sets, thereby intensifying competition.
Adding to these pressures, crowd workers must contend with deadlines (Rengo, 
2016). This clearly, therefore, calls into question the notion that crowd work is 
autonomous work. In addition, CrowdWorks uses a time-card system, which logs 
a worker’s status and enables employers to check who’s working and available and 
identify the projects on which they are working. Such a level of monitoring further 
belies the notion that crowd workers are free and autonomous. Instead, they can 
be monitored constantly as they work on online platforms rather than in offices.
Crowd workers face yet another form of control in that they receive remunera-
tion only after clients confirm that their tasks are complete. This is where workers 
often encounter troubles with their clients. Unless a client confirms its approval of 
a crowd worker’s performance, that worker is not assured of receiving payment. 
In cases involving multiple revisions or follow-up work that fails to satisfy clients, 
when clients refuse to accept revised versions of a job, crowd workers suffer non-
payment or underpayment for their work (Freelance-fans, 2017).
This employment structure represents a new form of control and domination 
enabled by crowd working. The industry has yet to establish an adequate level 
of regulation of client firms, in whose hands the fates of crowd workers rest. 
Crowd workers are continuously expected to prove their availability, efficiency 
and performance quality, something enabled by the technological development of 
crowdsourcing. Crowd workers’ putative autonomy is actually paradoxical insofar 
as their lives are controlled by the productive relationship in which crowdsourcing 
and client firms dictate the terms of their contracts, and they experience heavy work 
pressure as a result of their flexible working practices.
Growing Uncertainty over Crowd Work
The majority of crowd workers (90 per cent), including highly skilled knowledge 
workers, express concern over their work (Rengo, 2016). A majority, 51.8 per cent, 
of surveyed crowd workers are worried about whether their opportunities to work 
will remain available (Rengo, 2016). This is particularly notable among low-skilled 
workers who engage in micro-tasks and who view themselves as easily replaceable.
Many low-skilled crowd workers also find their work unrewarding. For instance, 
a low-skilled crowd worker mentioned, ‘I am not a volunteer and since I don’t 
receive adequate pay I don’t find crowd work interesting or worth doing’ (Zaitaku 
Worker, 2018b, author’s translation). Many comment that they cannot find the right 
jobs or that it generally takes a long time to find appropriate jobs. The procedure 
involved in finding jobs and obtaining remuneration is also said to be cumber-
some. These concerns reflect the unreliable nature of online work, and workers 
are not convinced they can find rewarding jobs and hence they do not necessarily 
feel autonomous.
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Indeed, more than 20 per cent of crowd workers expressed concern over whether 
their clients would honour their contracts or would ever pay them. For instance, 
some high-skilled crowd workers complained on the online site that their ‘clients 
suddenly cancelled their contracts half-way through their tasks’ or ‘right after a 
contract was finalized’ (CrowdWorks, 2018). One worker said, ‘I heard that my 
project was not selected. I asked for feedback, but I only found out that the client 
firm was no longer there. That client stole my work without payment’ (CrowdWorks, 
2018, author’s translation).
In these cases, clients did not honour contracts or stole ideas before they had 
finalised contracts and, in those cases, there were no payments to crowd workers. 
Some highly skilled crowd workers therefore consider crowd work unrewarding and 
are increasingly aware of the risks involved in working for crowdsourcing clients.
As a result of the multiple uncertainties surrounding both high- and low-skilled 
crowd workers, these workers typically report high levels of anxiety regarding job 
security, the availability of work, task performance and task deadlines. Workers’ 
minds and bodies are not the private property of capital, but they are unfree, com-
pelled by the ‘silent compulsion of economic relations’ (Marx, 1867, cited in Fuchs, 
2017, p. 14). Yet crowd work is idealised by the Japanese government, employers 
and sometimes by workers themselves for freedom and autonomy. In contrast, the 
reality of crowd work is such that workers are increasingly ‘unfree’, in that they 
are compelled to work harder and be more efficient to win contracts.
Gender Pay Gap
Some claim that platform-based work reproduces gender inequality (Barzilay & 
Ben-David, 2017). Nearly 50 per cent of female crowd workers engage in task-based 
work which requires low skills, including writing, data input, simple administra-
tive tasks and organising pay slips, whereas 33 per cent of male workers engage in 
these tasks (Rengo, 2016). These are typical tasks for female workers, who engage 
in unpaid household/care work but can use their spare time crowd-working to earn 
income. These simple tasks provide very low pay, and this reflects the greater dis-
satisfaction over pay rates among female crowd workers. Rengo (2016) reports 
that nearly 52 per cent of female crowd workers are not satisfied with their pay. 
On the other hand, male workers tend to engage in high-skilled projects such as 
systems engineering, which pay higher fees, leading to a higher level of satisfaction 
among male workers (Rengo, 2016). This results in gender-based wage disparity 
in the crowdsourcing sector that is similar to that in the traditional labour market. 
In addition, opportunities that crowd work generates chain female workers to 
low-paid tasks because in Japan they are largely responsible for household work, 
further widening the gender pay gap.
Pitfalls of Deregulated Labour
Troubles between crowd workers and their employers are often reported. Many 
crowd workers have experienced delayed payments (20 per cent), underpayment or 
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no pay at all (17 per cent) and unreasonably low pay (16 per cent) (Rengo, 2016). 
Roughly 53 per cent of survey respondents, therefore, experienced pay-related 
problems. According to the online site where crowd workers evaluate crowdsourcing 
companies, 43 per cent of crowd workers who obtained work through the platform 
Shufti, which connects housewives with clients, experienced troubles with those 
client employers. This may imply that client employers seek housewives in crowd-
sourcing because they are not primary household income earners and therefore 
will work for lower pay.
Many companies have integrated crowd service into their staffing strategies to 
reduce office costs and protect their core employees. It is not hard to imagine that 
this sometimes creates inappropriate pay rates for crowd workers. Employers can 
avoid providing employee benefits/insurance, which employers are supposed to 
provide to both regular and non-crowdsourced non-regular workers. This practice 
indicates a concrete step towards further flexibilisation of labour. This generates 
anxieties over remuneration and employment security among the majority of 
crowd workers.
As we have seen, the major crowdsourcing platforms in Japan have created 
a new form of work that is characterised by de-skilling, anxiety, insecurity and 
a system of payment that creates cash-flow shortfalls for workers. As such, it is 
difficult to uphold the claim, made by its advocates, that crowd work is a means 
by which workers are able to enhance their autonomy and creativity. It should be 
noted that those working on a piecemeal basis are not alone in their dissatisfac-
tion with crowd work. Crowd workers who engage in systems engineering and 
computer programming complain about the challenge of time management caused 
by the pressure they experience meeting deadlines and carrying heavy workloads. 
Many crowd workers (roughly 40 per cent) see themselves as working outside of 
the protection of the Labour Standards Act (Rengo, 2016). This, therefore, enables 
employers who hire crowd workers to exploit the absence of regulations.
Conclusion
Crowdsourcing firms, their clients and the government advocate that crowd work 
provides opportunities for workers to enjoy autonomous working practices, enabling 
subpopulations such as women and the elderly who would otherwise be excluded 
from the labour market to find employment. As this article has sought to show, this 
is far from the case. Instead, crowdsourcing is perhaps better considered a means, 
enabled by technological advances, by which to flexibilise the labour market. 
Many crowd workers find this new working practice, digital labour, satisfying in 
some ways, but many also have experienced problems with clients over late, low 
or absent payments or cancelled jobs. Crowd workers are not adequately protected. 
The chief benefit of crowd work is that it enables firms to mask the intensifica-
tion of exploitation behind superficial notions of autonomy and freedom, thereby 
concealing the additional precarity that it introduces to the Japanese labour market. 
Some degree of autonomy is felt by many workers, but they also sense that they 
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are controlled, which manifests in the paradoxical autonomy of crowd work. This 
further implies that crowd work is embedded in contemporary antagonisms in 
Japanese employment relations.
Crowdsourcing is, therefore, associated with low pay, the absence of welfare 
entitlements, precarious access to work, heightened competition, uncertainty over 
pay, performance and deadlines, and deterioration in the work-life balance. It also 
contributes to a widening gender pay gap, locking women into low-paid, low-skilled 
jobs. Crowd work has a tendency to be associated with zero-hour contracts, in 
which work is not guaranteed and payment is unreliable. As such, crowdsourcing 
has produced within Japan a new group of precarious workers that exists alongside 
an already-expanding (non-crowdsourced) non-regular section of the workforce. 
These crowd workers are controlled differently from previous workers insofar as 
their work is not all that autonomous—they face strict deadlines, online evalua-
tion mechanisms and continuous employment insecurity since many workers find 
it hard to find the right jobs or earn adequate remuneration. This is a new form of 
control imposed on digital labour.
Challenged by these working conditions, crowd workers face a range of obsta-
cles. The online, invisible and individualised nature of their working lives makes it 
difficult to organise to voice collective dissent. This explains why acts of outright 
resistance against the development of crowd work are yet to occur, although few 
government regulations protect them. We may witness the emergence of greater 
demand for public regulation of working hours and wages. As other non-regular 
workers’ criticisms against the lack of governmental protection problematise the 
flexibilisation of labour, crowd workers may find opportunities to impact the 
government’s policies regarding this new form of digital labour.
The emergence of a new layer of precarious crowd workers in the Japanese 
labour market is not, however, a unique phenomenon. It is shared by many 
advanced economies, each of which has begun to witness a growing trend towards 
crowdsourcing as a core recruiting strategy for cost-focused firms. In the case of 
Japan’s already-dualised and gendered labour market, businesses expand but the 
labour market from which they draw crowdsourced workers is characterised by 
exploitative employment practices, especially for non-regular and female crowd 
workers. This compounds the already rising levels of wage inequality, while per-
haps going some way towards resolving problems associated with Japan’s ageing 
population. As such, we might expect the number of crowd workers to continue to 
grow, necessitating further research focused on the experience of crowd workers, 
their role within the Japanese economy, and their potential for exercising agency 
through resistance and the resultant public policy responses.
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